Pros and Cons of a Super Regulator – The case of the Spanish Regulator

This article was first published by Inter Press Service (IPS)


Leonardo Beltrán and Andrés Chambouleyron are non-resident Fellows at the Institute of the Americas located in La Jolla, California.

Extraordinary session of the Senate of the Republic of Mexico, June 29, 2020. Credit: Senado de Mexico.


LA JOLLA, California, United States, Jul 20 2020 (IPS) – On June 10, 2020, Senator Ricardo Monreal, President of the Political Coordination Board of the Senate of Mexico, presented a legislative initiative to reform Article 28 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, in order to cluster in a single regulator of economic competition, the Telecommunications, Broadcasting and Energy sectors.

The initiative contemplates the creation of the National Institute of Markets and Competition for Social Well-being “INMECOB” as an autonomous constitutional body with legal identity, technical, operational and management autonomy that would replace the following institutions:

  1. The Federal Commission of Economic Competition (“COFECE”)
  2. The Energy Regulatory Commission (“CRE”)
  3. The Federal Telecommunications Institute (“IFT”)

The main purpose of the initiative is to contribute to the austerity policy of President López Obrador administration, with the integration of these three regulators that, although they share some general characteristics and objectives, the final goods and/or services they provide are different.

The three regulators are intended to ensure that social welfare is maximized through economic competition in each sector, for example, by ensuring free access for competitors in cases where due to the characteristics of the infrastructure they naturally tend to become monopolies (i.e. electrical networks or gas pipelines, where duplicating the infrastructure would result in a much higher cost to the final consumer).

Although the legal framework of the three regulators, in terms of competition, is the same, each institution applies a different set of processes, which can result in different evaluation standards that could penalize or benefit individuals simply due to the interpretation and organizational culture of each entity in question.

Likewise, administrative management in terms of procurement of goods and services, material and equipment, social communication, among other functions, could be optimized by integrating them into a single institution.

The initiative estimates that from the merger of the three institutions, savings of 500 million pesos per year (22 million dollars) could be obtained, as a result of the reduction in the workforce and operating budget of both COFECE and IFT, where 79.6% is represented by cutting out 440 positions (1 in 5 employees) and the rest would come from general services or operating expenses.

The initiative also argues that in addition to the financial benefit, there will be a lower risk in the capture of the regulator by the private sector, as the relative importance of a certain sector would be reduced within the activities of the regulatory body.

Considering that Senator Monreal’s project cites the National Commission of Markets and Competition of Spain as a precedent for consolidating competition authorities and sector regulators in a single body, we analyzed in detail this particular case and its potential application to the Mexican case.


The role of the National Commission of Markets and Competition in Spain

According to its own internet portal, the recently created (2013) National Commission of Markets and Competition (CNMC) aims to guarantee, preserve and promote the proper functioning and transparency of markets, ensuring the existence of effective competition and defending the interests of consumers and companies.

It is a public body with its own legal personality under parliamentary control, which guarantees its independence from the government and legal certainty.

The CNMC is the result of merging the former National Competition Commission (CNC) created in 2007 with sector regulators – the National Energy Commission (CNE), the Telecommunications Market Commission (CMT), the Committee of Railway Regulation (CRF), the State Council for Audiovisual Media (CEMA), the National Commission of the Postal Sector (CNSP) and finally the Airport Economic Regulation Commission (CREA).

The functions of the National Competition Commission (CNC) were essentially three, a) the prosecution of anticompetitive behaviors such as collusive behaviors and abuses of dominant positions, b) the control of operations with economic concentration (prior control of mergers or acquisitions), and c) the promotion of competition in those concentrated markets through liberalization or a greater opening.

Similarly, the National Energy Commission (CNE) created in 1998 had as its essential mission to ensure effective competition in energy systems, which would include the electricity market, as well as the markets for both liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons (natural gas and oil).

The CNE regulated tariffs and service quality in natural monopolies (electricity and gas distribution and transport networks), but also promoted competition in those segments where competition was not effective (gas and electricity commercialization) and resolved conflicts or disputes between different market agents (access to transport networks).

On the other hand, the objectives of the Telecommunications Market Commission (CMT) created in 1996 were a) to be the arbitrator between operators in the face of conflicts such as network interconnection, b) to control compliance with universal service obligations, c) to assign numbering to the operators, d) to adopt measures to ensure free competition between operators, e) to set rates for regulated services, f) to set interconnection charges between networks, g) to exercise sanctioning power, h) to carry out analysis and definition of markets and finally i) to coordinate its functions with the National Competition Commission.

Lastly, the objectives of the Committee for Railway Regulation (CRF), the State Council for Audiovisual Media (CEMA), the National Commission for the Postal Sector (CNSP) and the Commission for Airport Economic Regulation (CREA) were to regulate each of the markets by setting tariffs where competition was not possible and deregulating and promoting competition where it was technically feasible and desirable.

The creation of these regulatory bodies was due to the privatization of state-owned public service companies, the end of state monopolies and the need for Spain to adapt to European regulations.


Operation of the CNMC

The CNMC exercises its functions through two governmental bodies: the Council and the President, who is also the Council’ president. The Council is a collegiate decision-making body made up of ten members appointed by the Government with the proposal of the Economy and Competitiveness Minister, and includes persons of recognized prestige and professional competence, after the candidate appears before the corresponding Commission of the Congress of Deputies. Their mandate is for 6 years, non-renewable and is subject to a strict incompatibility regime.

The Council can act in Plenary or in Room. To this end, it is organized into two rooms: one dedicated to competition issues (Competition Room) and the other to supervision of regulated sectors (Regulatory Supervision Room). The Plenary is made up of all the members of the Council and chaired by the President.

In addition, the CNMC has four directions of instruction: Competition; Energy; Telecommunications and the Audiovisual Sector, as well as Transport and the Postal Sector, as illustrated in the following table.



What are the advantages of a consolidated body?

The arguments used by the Spanish government to justify the consolidation process of the competition authority and the sector regulators in a single body are basically the following: 1) guarantee legal certainty and institutional trust, 2) avoid unnecessary duplication of control of each operator and contradictory decisions in the same matter, 3) take advantage of economies of scale and regulate the administered sectors, establishing an integrating vision in terms of regulation and the defense of competition to adapt it to the changes that have occurred in the economic environment for the benefit of consumers, 4) aim at effectiveness, efficiency, rationalization, agility, objectivity and transparency, 5) unify criteria to offer a balanced and comprehensive solution to consumer problems, 6) adjust the operation of the regulatory authority to the regulations of the European Union, especially in the telecommunications and energy sectors, seeking a greater market integration of the European Single Market.

In summary, what they were looking for was to save administrative costs, streamline and make management more transparent, avoiding duplication and preventing potentially contradictory opinions by unifying criteria in a single agency.


Economic analysis and application to the Mexican case

The creation of the original sectoral regulators that regulated energy, telecommunications, railways, ports and the postal market occurred due to the need generated after the privatization of the former state monopolies by becoming private monopolies.

Sector regulation in this case is essentially an ex-ante regulation that is applied to those segments of the markets considered natural monopolies, which are unable to compete due to their technology. These segments are normally electricity and gas distribution and transport networks as well as the old landline network before the irruption of mobile and internet.

In these cases the regulation is ex-ante because it is applied before observing how the market behaves, since it is assumed that natural monopolies (by definition) cannot compete and therefore their rates must be regulated and they must provide their services with a minimum acceptable level of quality.

The body in charge of defending and promoting competition, on the other hand, exercises supervision and eventually also regulation, but of an ex-post type, on those markets in which anti-competitive behavior is observed. In this case the remedy (e.g. sanctions or prohibitions, obligations etc.) is applied after observing how competitive the market is, not before, because it is not possible to predict how competitive a market will be before observing how the companies behave in that market.

The eventual state intervention in a market is normally subsequent to the observation and verification of anti-competitive behavior by the authority.

It is for these two reasons that both types of agencies (competition and sector regulator) are normally separate: their nature is different because they serve markets and/or companies with different characteristics or technologies. Some are natural monopolies that require ex-ante regulation of rates and quality due to their technological impossibility of competing and the others operate in markets that are not competitive enough and that require supervision and (eventually) ex-post regulation to inject more competition, which is, by nature, impossible to achieve in the first group.

While there are segments within regulated sectors that are potentially competitive, such as the production, generation, and commercialization of natural gas and electricity, where sector regulators normally have the power to make ex-post regulation by deregulating potentially competitive markets, the competition agencies are the natural authorities to apply such policies.

Having said all this, there is no argument (economic at least) that justifies the adoption of a super regulatory body that consolidates the competition authority and the sector regulators.

Reviewing the arguments put forward by the Spanish authorities in the previous section, it can be easily verified that: 1) All the advantages that a single regulator supposedly has would also be shown by two separate regulators: one competition authority on the one hand and another multi-sector regulator on the other that regulates natural monopolies, 2) In fact, the CNMC works with 2 suites, the Competition Suite and the Regulatory Supervision Suite, each suite with its directions of instruction that operate separately.

Apparently, and judging by the arguments wielded by the Spanish authorities, the only advantage that the creation of a single authority would offer (in addition to complying with some European regulations) would be to have a single board of directors and a single president, avoiding duplication and reducing administrative costs.

It is clear that for the Mexican case, neither of the two apparent advantages put forward by the Spanish authorities would apply, since, on the one hand, there are no USMCA regulations obligating to adopt a similar measure (Canada and the United States have separate authorities) and there is no assurance that consolidating the current competition authority and sector regulators into one body will result in lower administrative costs.

The CRE of Mexico also has the power to dispose of the income derived from the rights and uses that are established for its services to finance its total budget and a public trust in which it will contribute the remainder of the excess income that it has to accumulate the equivalent to three times its annual budget and if there are additional resources, these will be transferred to the Treasury of the Federation.

This means that CRE’s operation does not represent a burden for public finances and that the cost is self-sustaining from the payment of those regulated by the reception of the service. The CRE, in addition to the regulatory mandate in economic matters, has the mandate to establish technical regulations to address the reliability, stability and security in the supply and provision of electrical energy services, a technical attribute that does not share with the other two Mexican institutions.

In summary, the consolidation project presented does not seem to be able to guarantee any of the objectives it pursues, neither reduction of administrative costs nor less capture power by the authorities. In fact, consolidation into a single agency could generate a superstructure with greater duplications than those that exist today, and nothing guarantees that the new agency will be less prone to capture by the regulated sectors.

Will Mexico’s regulatory level playing field survive? A conversation with the experts

Will Mexico’s regulatory level playing field survive? A conversation with the experts

The second presentation in the Institute of the Americas/Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center’s “Clean Energy in Mexico” webinar series will feature a discussion of regulatory developments and the implications for the Mexican power market and its medium and long-term outlook.

The virtual panel will feature three former regulators in Mexico: Former CRE Chairman Francisco Xavier Salazar and former CRE Commissioners Montserrat Ramiro and Guillermo Zuniga.

The former regulators and experts will share their insights and perspectives on the wide range of issues facing the power sector and regulatory environment derived from COVID-19, but also government policy edicts, cuts in staff and a legislative proposal to completely overhaul Mexico’s regulatory institutions and framework.

Energy Integration Key After the Pandemic

This article was first published by Mexico Business


By Leonardo Beltrán | Wed, 07/01/2020

If there is one thing, we have learned with the pandemic is that we cannot live in isolation. Developed and developing countries alike are struggling to maintain their economic sustenance, irrespective of their individual specialization and/or competitive advantage. Whether it is an agricultural, industrial or services exporting world power, the lockdowns have suddenly halted their momentum. However, the pandemic has shed light on the opportunities to enhance our collaborative work and strengthen our resiliency and stamina to weather the crisis.

There are a number of companies, labs, and academic institutions doing research to advance knowledge and develop solutions to reduce the cost of treatments or to eradicate diseases. However, individual efforts are not enough to solve a global challenge. There are several examples of the power of international cooperation. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 1988, the poliovirus was affecting more than 125 countries and paralyzed around 350,000 people per year. That year, the international community set the goal to eliminate the disease, and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative was launched. Ever since, the number of cases has been almost eliminated (over 99%) due to immunization efforts, sparing over 13 million children from paralysis.

Another example of the benefits of international cooperation in public health is Malaria. This disease can cause lifelong intellectual disabilities in children, and its economic impact is estimated to cost billions of dollars in lost productivity every year. An estimated 219 million people suffered from the disease in 2017 and about 435,000 died. However, in the last two decades, mortality from malaria has been halved, thanks to a coordinated research agenda, and a rise in funding. It is clear that isolation is just a local and transitory measure that requires a global coordinated effort to speed up the process out of a pandemic.

Public health examples offer a wealth of knowledge to understand the complexities, interdependencies, and implications of a global challenge. In a pandemic, the more integrated a country, the faster the virus spreads across borders. In the economy, similar to what happens in a pandemic but in positive terms, the more complementary and complex the value chains across products, the more sophisticated and developed the country would be. The interconnectedness of a globalized world enhances economic development grounded on the accumulation of knowledge and its use in both a larger number and more complex industries.

According to Harvard’s Growth Lab, Mexico at the beginning of the century ranked 25th in their Economic Complexity –EC– index (measures the number and complexity of the products they successfully export). That year, more than half of Mexico’s exports were automobiles and auto parts, machinery, electronics and minerals, and the Mexican economy represented around three-quarters of the Chinese economy, which ranked 39th, and the majority of its exports were services, textiles, machinery and electronics. Eighteen years later, China has quintupled its economy, ranking 18th in the EC index, diversified its exports and increased the contribution of its electronics, metals, and chemical exports, surpassing Mexico in the EC index (19th). Meanwhile, Mexico´s economy in the same period increased 43 percent and has maintained a similar export pattern, although with a larger proportion of auto and auto parts exports than in 2000. Thus, in spite of Mexico being the country with the most trade treaties signed (more than 50 countries, over 60% of world GDP), a focus on less complex goods (manufacturing and agriculture) has resulted in a more competitive environment for its products; whereas in China, an increasing specialization in technology-oriented exports have resulted in less competition for its products, and faster development paths, similar to what happened as well in South Korea (ranked 19th in 2000 versus third in 2018) and Singapore (ranked 11th in 2000 versus fifth in 2018).

Both public health and trade offer best practices and lessons learned applicable to the energy sector. One of the lessons learned is that isolation limits the potential to create virtuous cycles, and one of the best practices is international cooperation because it opens the opportunity to multiply the combined capabilities of the partners to tackle a challenge.

The challenge in the energy sector of the 21st century is to have a balanced system, one based upon energy security, sustainability and equity (the World Energy Council´s Energy Trilemma). Such a system would enable economic prosperity, social development, and environmental conservation. Some countries would choose to focus on energy sovereignty as a means to enhance their energy security, which would require a coordinated national effort and would be subject to their domestic resources (talent, innovation, and funding) that can lead them to the best those capabilities can offer. But some other countries would choose to enhance their energy security by integrating, which would also need coordination (national and international), and would be subject to both their domestic resources and the complementary resources of their partners, leading to a better result by multiplying resources and taking advantage of a combined potential.

A great example of the power of international cooperation applied in the energy sector is the Nord Pool. In 1996, Norway and Sweden decided to integrate their power markets. Today, Nord Pool is a system that trades 40 percent more energy than Mexico (321.2 TWh vs. 592 TWh Nord Pool) with 380 companies from 21 countries in the Nordic and Baltic regions, Germany and the UK. They established what a modern power exchange business looks like, and what has now become the EU European Target Model. It is a system that has brought economic prosperity, social development, and environmental conservation not only to Scandinavia, but soon enough to all of Europe.

In terms of equity and sustainability, the international scientific community has provided evidence to support that the way forward is to reduce the use of fossil fuels; thus, the international community committed in 2015 to decarbonize their economies by 2050. Some countries would speed up this process, by closing fossil fuel plants and electrifying their economies. Some others would work on developing technology to continue to use their existing assets, but limiting their environmental footprint. Some others would accelerate the uptake of renewable energy technologies. Irrespective of their individual paths, the energy transition would require both the public and private sectors, and national and international institutions, to decarbonize their energy sectors and their economies.

In this context, Mexico has a superior advantage to choose the most efficient path toward decarbonization for five reasons: it has an unlimited amount of renewable resources; it has a strong domestic market; is located south of the largest market in the world, with the potential to integrate both with the US and Central America; it has access to 60% of the world’s GDP with its network of free trade agreements; and an already proven investment-attractive energy legal framework. Therefore, the choice is for us to make. Nevertheless, after the pandemic, energy integration would place our country on the most efficient path to economic recovery and deep decarbonization.

June 2020

June 2020

Welcome to the June edition of Energy Panorama. We begin this month’s newsletter with a note of welcome for the incoming president of the Institute of the Americas, Richard Kiy, and an expression of gratitude to Ted Gildred III as he winds down his term as interim president. More details on the new IOA president, Richard Kiy, below.

This month’s featured report “The Day After: Latin America’s response to key energy issues derived from COVID-19” by principal author Roger Tissot is a detailed analysis based on policy and political trends likely to impact several countries’ oil industries as they emerge from the COVID-19 health crisis; how the region arrived at the pandemic crisis and how countries responded and the key emerging trends that are likely to influence policy decisions in Latin America and the so-called “day after.”

We are also pleased to share the summary report and synopsis derived from the discussions at the Virtual XXIX La Jolla Conference, as well as several of the panel videos and news coverage.

The Virtual La Jolla Conference convened as the implications of COVID-19 and the massive shock to the global oil market and its impact across the hemisphere were being felt. The discussion focused on whether the energy transition was being accelerated or delayed, the role for the region’s NOC’s particularly in recovery, the potential for key plays such as Guyana, the Pre-Salt, Vaca Muerta, Camisea and fracking in Colombia. A cross-cutting and recurring debate over whether habits and consumption had temporarily or permanently changed yielded a variety of replies. How countries and energy policymakers are navigating the dual crises were very much on display and, as expected, differed from Mexico to Chile to Peru to Uruguay to Argentina.

Our assessment of the energy transition continued this month and clean hydrogen in Latin America was at the center of two articles – one in Spanish and one in English – by Cecilia Aguillon, Director of the IOA’s Energy Transition Initiative.

Clean Energy in Mexico, our webinar series in collaboration with the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center, kicked-off with John McNeece’s presentation of our jointly-published paper “The Economic and Strategic Arguments for Renewable Energy in Mexico.”

We also convened a virtual panel discussion focused on the energy sector in Bolivia and outlook for the next administration featuring representatives from the major political parties vying in the September election. The event also featured opening remarks from IOA Board member Jose Luis Manzano.

We are also pleased to continue to bring you the insights of IOA Board member Chris Sladen and his essays written for ANZMEX, of which there were two released in June.

We look forward to our collaboration with CEBRI in Brazil on a unique virtual panel on July 15, as well as our partnership with IPD Latin America and Global Event Partners for the second Madrid Energy Conference set for Sep 28-Oct 2, being presented and held online this year.

Richard Kiy Named President of the Institute of the Americas

Read Article


XXIX La Jolla Energy Conference – Summary Report

The Day After: Latin America’s response to key energy issues derived from COVID-19

La Jolla Conference Videos

IOA YouTube channel

La Jolla Conference in the News

Media coverage and stories from the Virtual La Jolla Conference

Opinion & Analysis

Clean Hydrogen in Spanish – PV World

Clean Hydrogen in English – IPS

Chris Sladen ANZMEX Energy Matters Vol 18

Chris Sladen ANZMEX Energy Matters Vol 19

In the News

Las disyuntivas energéticas aguardan al próximo gobierno de Bolivia

Debate sobre el futuro energético de Bolivia


Bolivia’s Energy Future – Perspectives for the Next Administration

Clean Energy in Mexico Webinar Series featuring John McNeece

Webinar: Bolivia’s Energy Future – Perspectives for the Next Administration

Webinar: Bolivia’s Energy Future – Perspectives for the Next Administration

Presentation (PDF)

Bolivia’s October 2019 election resulted in accusations of fraud, protests, counter accusations of flawed models and the president’s departure. Evo Morales left office – and the country – after more than 13 years in power replaced by Jeanine Añez in charge of a transitional government with elections pending. The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic added another layer of complexity to the election calendar. But, now, the parties have agreed to hold the presidential election on September 6. With the pandemic and lockdown to confront the virus, the economy and recovery are critical themes for the next administration.

How Bolivia’s government manages the energy sector will be a key element to the broader economic development strategy and recovery in the coming months and after the new team takes office. Natural gas, a long-time generator of income for the Morales government, slumped in 2019 as part of a global commodity downturn. How a new government approaches the role of the state and specifically the national oil company, YPFB, will be important to understand, as will the energy relationship that Bolivia has developed with its neighbors, principally Brazil and Argentina. The facets of the global energy transition and the incorporation of renewable energy and further diversification of the country’s energy matrix also deserves attention from policymakers and the next team.

Among the energy-related challenges that a new Bolivian government will face are stimulating exploration for new reserves and establishing new avenues for gas exports. Brazil is increasingly awash in Pre-Salt gas, while Argentina is developing huge reserves of shale gas, leaving Bolivia with smaller markets for its landlocked supply. Under Morales, the government promoted a new pipeline to Paraguay.

Beyond natural gas, Bolivia has been trying to develop its extensive lithium reserves. Its fledgling effort recently sputtered with the government’s repeal of a joint venture agreement between Bolivia’s state-owned lithium company YLB and Germany’s ACI Systems to tap brine lithium from the Uyuni salt flats.

To better understand how the next administration will confront the energy challenges and role of the sector to drive economic development and recovery, we are pleased to convene a panel of Bolivian energy experts from across the political spectrum. The representatives will discuss their respective parties vision for the energy sector, their platform, and how, if elected, they will address the sector and what policy measures and steps they will take.

Join us for a virtual panel with Richard Botello, President of YPFB (pending); Miguel Antonio Roca, Spokesman for Comunidad Ciudadana and Coordinator of the Economic Team and Candidate for Congress from La Paz; Oscar Barriga, former president of YPFB and advisor to the MAS party.

Jose Luis Manzano, an IOA Board Member and Chairman of Integra Capital, will offer opening remarks and insights on the context for the global energy sector and in the Southern Cone.

The virtual panel webinar will be held Tuesday, June 30 at 9:00am San Diego (12:00 pm La Paz; GMT/UTC – 8 hours). The webinar will include a discussion and Q&A session with the audience.

El Futuro del Sector Energético de Bolivia – Perspectivas para la próxima administración

Las elecciones de octubre del 2019 en Bolivia resultaron en acusaciones de fraude, protestas, contra acusaciones de modelos defectuosos y la salida del presidente. Evo Morales dejó el cargo, y el país, después de más de 13 años en el poder, reemplazado por Jeanine Añez, quien quedó a cargo de un gobierno de transición con elecciones pendientes. La llegada de la pandemia COVID-19 agregó otra capa de complejidad al calendario electoral. Pero ahora, los partidos acordaron realizar las elecciones presidenciales el 6 de septiembre. Con la pandemia y cuarentena para enfrentar el virus, la economía y la recuperación son temas críticos para la próxima administración.

La forma en que el gobierno de Bolivia maneje el sector energético será un elemento clave para la estrategia general de desarrollo económico y de recuperación en los próximos meses y después de que el nuevo equipo asuma su cargo. El gas natural, un generador de ingresos durante mucho tiempo para el gobierno de Morales, se desplomó en el 2019 como parte de la caída del mercado mundial de productos básicos. Será importante entender cómo un nuevo gobierno aborda el papel del estado y específicamente la compañía petrolera nacional, YPFB, al igual que la relación energética que Bolivia ha desarrollado con sus vecinos, principalmente Brasil y Argentina. Las facetas de la transición energética global y la incorporación de energías renovables, así como una mayor diversificación de la matriz energética del país, también merecen la atención de los encargados de formular políticas y del próximo equipo de trabajo.

Entre los desafíos relacionados con la energía que enfrentará el nuevo gobierno boliviano están estimular la exploración de nuevas reservas y establecer nuevas vías para las exportaciones de gas. Brasil está cada vez más inundado de gas Pre-Sal, mientras que Argentina está desarrollando enormes reservas de gas de esquisto, dejando a Bolivia con mercados más pequeños para su suministro sin litoral. Bajo Morales, el gobierno promovió un nuevo gasoducto a Paraguay.

Más allá del gas natural, Bolivia ha estado tratando de desarrollar sus extensas reservas de litio. Este nuevo esfuerzo recientemente produjo resultados con la derogación por parte del gobierno de un acuerdo de empresa conjunta entre la compañía estatal de litio YLB de Bolivia y ACI Systems de Alemania para explotar el litio de salmuera de las salinas de Uyuni.

Para comprender mejor cómo la próxima administración enfrentará los desafíos energéticos y el papel del sector para impulsar el desarrollo económico y la recuperación, nos complace convocar a un panel de expertos en energía bolivianos de todo el espectro político. Los representantes discutirán la visión de sus respectivos partidos para el sector energético, su plataforma y si son elegidos, cómo abordarán el sector y qué políticas y pasos implementarán.

Unase a nuestro panel virtual con Richard Botello, Presidente de YPFB (pendiente); Miguel Angel Roca, Vocero de Comunidad Ciudadana y Coordinador del Equipo de Economía y Candidato a Diputado por La Paz y Oscar Barriga, expresidente de YPFB y asesor del partido MAS.

José Luis Manzano, miembro de la Junta del IOA y presidente de Integra Capital, ofrecerá unas palabras de apertura y perspectivas en el contexto del sector energético global y del Cono Sur.

El panel virtual se llevará a cabo el martes 30 de junio a las 9:00 am San Diego (12:00 pm La Paz; GMT / UTC – 8 horas). El panel incluirá una discusión y sesión de preguntas y respuestas con la audiencia.

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